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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 29 1978 NUMBER 4 
THE MOBIUS STRIP OF THE FffiST 
AMENDMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON RED 
LION* 
WILLIAM w. VAN ALSTYNE** 
I. INTRODUCTION: A TALE oF Two CAsEs 
The airwaves in this country are governed principally by the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934.1 Substantially imitating 
the Radio Act of 1927,2 the Communications Act prohibits all 
claims of private property to the airwaves and vests sole authority 
to license the private use of the airwaves in a government agency, 
the Federal Communications Commission [FCC]. In electing 
this system of control, Congress made a choice which, in signifi-
cant respects, was much the same as that which the English 
monarchy had made nearly three centuries earlier for the press 
with the establishment of the crown's Stationers' Monopoly and 
the outlawry of private publications not licensed by that monop-
oly.3 
Unlike the standards which were to guide the Stationers' 
Monopoly, however, the standards of the Communications Act 
did not contemplate that the FCC would grant or withhold licen-
ses on the basis of the political or religious content of an appli-
cant's proposed broadcasts. Instead, Congress adopted a general 
* This essay-article was originally presented on April14, 1977, at the University of 
South Carolina School of Law as the First Annual Benjamin Hagood Distinguished Lec-
ture. I am grateful to the Law School and to the Hagood family for their hospitality. I am 
also grateful to the editors of the South Carolina Law Review for permitting me to retain 
the informality of an essay, with a bare minimum of footnotes. Additional references for 
the law-descriptive portions of this essay are readily supplied elsewhere in the extensive 
literature on this subject. Where appropriate, I have provided footnotes to that literature. 
** William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University: 
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970) (originally enacted as Federal Communications Act 
of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064). 
2. Radio Act, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (pt. IT) (1927) (repealed 1934). 
3. 1 E. ArulER, A 'fRANSCRIPI' OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF 
LONDON xxviii (1875). See C. BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS CoMPANY: A HISTORY 1403-1959 
(1960); L. LEVY, LEGACY oF SuPPRESSION 88-125 (1960); F. SIEBERT, FREEDoM oF THE PRESs 
IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, at 64-263 (1952). 
539 
540 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
standard of licensing in imitation of that which it had adopted 
for the very first of the independent regulatory agencies, the In-
terstate Commerce Commission.4 In brief, applications for licen-
ses were to be determined by the FCC according to the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.5 
Still, in applying that standard, the FCC did not confine 
itself to the issuance of licenses simply by examining the financial 
responsibility and technical competence of license applicants. 
Rather, it began very early also to police the program content of 
applicants and of licensees. One may think of this partly by anal-
ogy to the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission, whose 
statutory standard Congress had borrowed in establishing the 
FCC: the FCC was determining whether the "public interest, 
convenience, and necessity" would be well served partly by ask-
ing what kind of freight would be carried by the broadcaster. One 
may also think of this, however, with vague misgivings and recol-
lections of the Stationers' Monopoly. 
The development of FCC program-content standards has 
been thoroughly presented elsewhere.6 It should be sufficient here 
merely to recapitulate the current situation. An applicant is re-
quired to survey community interests within the receiving area of 
the broadcast signal for which he seeks a license, and to file with 
its application a profile of proposed programming according to 
the percentage of time he proposes to devote to each of fourteen 
Commission-described subject areas. Each licensee is required to 
devote a nontrivial portion of broadcast time to the treatment of 
public issues deemed significant within his broadcast area. Each 
is to do so at his own expense, if commercial sponsorship is una-
vailable, whether or not the licensee would personally have cho-
sen to forbear such coverage. At the same time, each licensee who 
broadcasts a partisan perspective on any public issue of a contra-
4. The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in the nineteenth century by 
the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), but the licensing provisions 
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)-(19) (1970)) were not added until1920 (subsec. (19) 
was subsequently repealed, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 801(b), 90 Stat. 127 (1976)). 
5. 47 u.s.c. §§ 151-609 (1970). 
6. The full development of FCC speech-content regulations is presented in Hegelin, 
The First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The Broadcast-Cable Controversy, 44 
U. CIN. L. REV. 427 (1975) and Simmons, Fairness Doctrine: The Early History, 29 FED. 
CoM. B. J. 207 (1976). The FCC's own most recent summary of the fairness doctrine 
rules is in In re the Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public 
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 RAo. REG. 2d (P & F) 1261 (July 12, 
1974). 
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versial nature must also take care to provide a fair representation 
of other views, although not necessarily on the same program and 
not necessarily in equal proportion to the time, or timing, of the 
original partisan broadcast. 7 This obligation is exacted of each 
licensee without regard to the extent to which other views may 
already be communicated over any number of other frequencies 
readily received in the same market, 8 and also without regard to 
the extent that those other views may already be featured in other 
sources of news and opinion (such as newspapers and magazines) 
readily accessible to persons within the same market.9 
Additionally, when an identifiable person is mentioned in 
some disparaging manner-although not necessarily in a false or 
a defamatory manner-in the course of a broadcast treating a 
controversial public issue, the licensee must use reasonable effort 
to contact that person and make available to him free time for a 
personal reply. This must be done whether the original broadcast 
was itself the product of a commercial sponsor or a presentation 
by the licensee, and the time must be offered without charge 
regardless of the individual's ability to pay for it.10 
Each of these, and other, 11 speech-content requirements ap-
plies regardless of the number of broadcast frequencies readily 
receivable in a given area. Each applies, moreover, without re-
gard to whether in fact a particular license issued by the FCC has 
no market value whatever and, assuming the license may have a 
market value, without regard to whether the particular broad-
caster has in fact already paid for that value.12 A good example 
of some of these "nonlegal" features of FCC regulation is dis-
played in the facts of its most famous case, Red Lion Broadcast-
7. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, Fairness Report Regarding Han-
dling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372 (1974). 
8. 30 RAo. REG. 2d (P & F) 1277-78 (July 12, 1974). 
9. See Brandywine Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63-80 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(Bazelon, J., dissenting), aff'g 27 F.C.C.2d 565 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). 
10. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
11. E.g., the separate statutory provisions, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970), which, subject to 
four exceptions, require that equal time be provided for all legally qualified candidates to 
the extent that any time is provided for any candidate and, of much more doubtful valid-
ity, the oversight of the Federal Communications Commission regarding "vulgar" broad-
casting or broadcasting deemed to be contrary to the public iJ;1terest in light of its mes-
sage, e.g., "drug oriented" music. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973), Sanderling Broadcasting Corp. WGLD-FM, 27 
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 285 (1973). 
12. When a licensee, with the FCC's consent, transfers his license to another, the 
inflated price paid by the purchaser for the broadcasting facilities and other "property" 
of the transferor reflects the market value of the license. 
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ing Co. v. FCC. 13 The licensee, who was required to honor the free 
reply requirement of the fairness doctrine, operated a smalll,OOO-
watt radio station in a town of 5,684 persons. The commercial rate 
of the station for one hour of prime time was only twenty-five 
dollars. The station was in competition with at least twenty AM 
and ten to fifteen FM stations readily receivable by the residents 
of Red Lion. There were also twelve television stations, received 
over cable in 2,080 homes, as well as local newspapers competing 
for advertiser dollars. 14 
In 1943, certain powers of the FCC were reviewed and sus-
tained by the United States Supreme Court. 15 Despite more wide-
ranging dicta in the case, however, the Court determined merely 
that the statutory standard of "public interest, convenience, and 
necessity" permitted the FCC to consider not only the technical 
competence and financial responsibility of a licensee, but also the 
licensee's economic position for antitrust purposes, in order to 
avoid undue concentration in broadcasting.16 Not untill969, how-
ever, did any of the FCC's speech-content regulations come under 
direct Supreme Court scrutiny for consideration of first amend-
ment objections. When these regulations-and more specifically, 
when the fairness regulations, including the free-time, right-of-
reply aspect of "fairness"-were at last reviewed, however, they 
were unanimously sustained. The Court found them wholly com-
patible with the first amendment's prohibition that "Congress 
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
press." 17 The Court was unanimous even though the regime of the 
FCC clearly involves mechanisms of licensing and prior restraint 
ultimately enforceable by a power to suspend, cancel, or nome-
new a license, without which the broadcaster is forbidden to 
broadcast at all. The case was Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC. 18 
* * * * * * 
13. 395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
14. These and other details are well described in F. FRIENDLY, THE Goon Guvs, THE 
BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5-7 (1975). 
15. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). See also Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944). 
16. 319 U.S. at 222-23. The validity of the FCC prohibition against cross-ownership 
of broadcast and newspaper media in the same location was recently upheld in FCC v. 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 46 U.S.L.W. 4609 (June 12, 1978). 
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. 
18. 395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
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In 1913, twenty-one years prior to Congress' adoption of the 
Federal Communications Act, the state legislature of Florida had 
adopted a similar, but more sharply limited statute. 19 It required 
any newspaper that presumed to assail the personal character or 
official record of any candidate in any election to print any non-
obscene and nonlibellous reply the candidate might make to the 
attack. The reply was to be printed without charge, in as conspic-
uous a place, and in the same kind of type as the disparaging 
story.20 The desirability (and constitutionality) of such statutes 
subsequently received substantial academic endorsement, 21 al-
beit not without dissent, 22 ·much as had been true of writings 
about the speech-content licensing regulations of the FCC.23 Not 
until1974, however, did the United States Supreme Court have 
occasion to consider a first amendment objection to the Florida 
statute. When it did, a unanimous Court, with Justice Burger 
writing the opinion, held that the statute was an unconstitutional 
invasion of the newspaper publisher's freedom of speech-and of 
the press. The case was Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo. 24 
The Court reached its decision in Tornillo notwithstanding 
its acknowledgment that the Florida statute involved no prior 
restraint on the publishing policy of the defendant newspaper. 
The Court invalidated the statute, moreover, fully understanding 
that the statute did not forbid any speech whatever by the Miami 
Herald. 25 At worst, the statute operated only as an indirect re-
straint upon the newspaper's freedom of speech insofar as the 
paper might be hesitant to publish its disparaging views in light 
of its statutory obligation to accept a reply. The Court also ac-
knowledged that daily newspapers are not casual or substantially 
uninfluential sources of daily news (compare the status ofWGCB 
in Red Lion).26 Indeed, the Miami Herald was the principal daily 
newspaper in the greater Miami area, with by far the dominant 
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (Harrison 1975) (repealed 1975). 
20. Id. 
21. See, e.g., J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PREss FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
. MASS MEDIA (1973); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 670-71 (1970). 
22. See, e.g., Lange, The Role for the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of Mass 
Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1973). 
23. See note 49 infra. 
24. 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
25. Id. at 256. 
26. ld. at 249. 
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daily circulation.27 As applied, moreover, the statute did no more 
than provide a right of reply to an individual in whom there was 
widespread public interest in Miami-a local resident and candi-
date for local office, who was disparaged precisely in terms of his 
suitability for that office. Clearly, the Court was well aware that 
the net effect of holding the statute invalid, even as applied, 
might well be to embolden the Miami Herald to press its unequal 
advantage in local politics, thereby unilaterally influencing the 
outcome of elections through its combination of heavy negative 
partisanship and substantial contributions to public misinforma-
tion.28 Finally, the Court, reaching its holding even though the 
actual cost to the Miami Herald of complying with the statute 
would have been negligible or nothing, declared: "Even if a news-
paper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory 
access law and would not be forced to forego publication of news 
or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida Statute fails to 
clear the barriers of the First Amendment .... "29 
It is possible to square either Tornillo or Red Lion with a 
single view of the first amendment. "Explaining" the first 
amendment consistency of both at once, however, has been a 
terrific academic strain. Professor Barrow of Hastings, 30 Professor 
Emerson of Yale, 31 and Professor Barron of George W ashington32 
believe that the Tornillo rationale is bad law. Professor Powe of 
Texas believes it is Red Lion, rather than Tornillo, that is bad 
law, that the case is plainly wrong and that its own premises are 
demonstrably unsound.33 Professor Bollinger of Michigan believes 
that the Red Lion regime might be unconstitutional, but because 
the private print media cannot be subject to any equivalent re-
straints and may thus serve both as a competitive goad to radio 
27. See F. FmENDLY, supra note 14, at 192-98; B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs. 
Pusuc AccESs 219-36 (1976). 
28. 418 U.S. at 258. 
29. ld. (emphasis added). 
30. Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print 
Media, 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 659 (1975). 
31. T. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 670-71. Subsequently, however, Professor Emerson 
appeared to be reconciled to Tornillo. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities 
of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737 (1977); Emerson, Legal Foundations of 
the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1. 
32. J. BARRON, supra note 21. 
33. Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast] Press," 55 TEXAS L. REv. 39 (1976). 
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and television and as a check against any self-censoring tenden-
cies by those media, the regime of Red Lion may be constitutional 
as limited to radio and television.34 Professor Kalven of Chicago 
wrote as though a result like that of Red Lion would not be com-
patible with the first amendment35 while Professor Karst of 
UCLA, with substantial reservations, believes that much of the 
case can be understood as compatible with the equality principle 
and the first amendment. 36 Yet, the most recent address to this 
much vexed (overvexed?) area concludes that Tornillo is correct 
and that Red Lion is in error because the regime of the FCC does 
not represent "the least restrictive alternative" among speech-
abridging means of regulating the airways. 37 
Professor Friendly of the Columbia University Journalism 
School believes that the first amendment issues of Tornillo and 
Red Lion are confounding even to those who want to give maxi-
mum protection to first amendment values, but who are unable 
to figure out which case "really" does this better! 38• Professor 
Schmidt of Columbia believes that Tornillo may well be rightly 
decided, but that nothing the Court declaims in the case is the 
least bit persuasive.39 His exposition of the difficulty with Tornillo 
is an excellent one and well worth our attention at this point. 
Professor Schmidt's questions about the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Tornillo go to the very heart of the Court's neglect of what 
it had said only five years earlier in Red Lion. 
The decision in Tornillo was based substantially on the point 
34. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial 
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
35. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & EcoN. 
15 (1967). 
36. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 
20, 43-52 (1975). Professor Karst's position is quite complex, resting in part on the observa-
tion that the government's peculiar involvement in the hegemony of its licensees may 
sustain certain third party requests for access based on the first amendment and express-
ing misgivings that the substitution of the FCC for the judicial determination of those 
claims is "shaky." See id. 46-50. 
37. Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media 
Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1976). 
38. Thus, witness the title of his book (THE GooD Guvs, THE BAD Guvs . . . ) and 
his quotation from Judge Wright in the frontispiece ("[in] some areas of the law it is easy 
to tell the good guys from the bad guys. . . . In the current ·debate . . . each de bator 
claims to be the real protector of the First Amendment. . . . ") and his conclusion in 
discussing Red Lion and Tornillo. ("The Supreme Court's inability to cope with Red Lion 
and Tornillo in the same opinion suggests that it recognizes the inherent contradiction of 
the two cases.") F. FRIENDLY, supra note 14, at 5-7, 198. 
39. B. ScHMIDT, supra note 27, at 227-31. 
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of view once observed by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson had himself 
been vilified by the Federalist press and yet observed: 
I deplore . . . the putrid state into which our newspapers have 
passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit 
of those who write them. . . . It is however an evil for which 
there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the freedom of the 
press, and that cannot be limited without being lost. 40 
Similarly, quoting Chafee's observation that "liberty of the press 
is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go 
into a newspaper,"41 Chief Justice Burger concluded in Tornillo: 
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions 
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and 
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or 
unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judg-
ment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regula-
tion of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First 
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to 
this time. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Florida is reversed.42 
Yet, the Florida Supreme Court, in upholding the statute as ap-
plied, 43 had relied very heavily upon the United States Supreme 
Court's own unanimous decision in Red Lion. In Red Lion the 
same Court had already concluded that evidently a way had been 
demonstrated by which governmental regulation to insure greater 
fairness was possible by means wholly congenial to the first 
amendment as it had evolved to that time.44 That way, as ap-
proved by the Supreme Court, was for the government 
(1) to establish by federal statute national government 
monopoly ownership of an entire medium of speech; 
(2) to outlaw any speech by any private party not issued 
a government license; 
(3) to vest sole licensing authority in a government agency 
to authorize such speech as, in its view, was consistent with "the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity"; 
40. T. JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 150-51 (Padover ed. 1939), quoted in CBS v. Demo-
cratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 153 (1972) (Douglas J., concurring). 
41. 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947), quoted in Miami 
Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 254, 258 (1974). 
42. 418 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added). 
43. 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973). 
44. 395 U.S. at 394-96. 
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(4) to include among its speech-content licensing tests a 
full, prompt, and free right of reply and also to impose very 
substantial additional "reply-type" burdens, such as the fuller 
affirmative duty to provide coverage of public issues the licensee 
would not himself elect to cover, and to provide a fair represen-
tation of dissenting views the licensee found inconsistent with 
his own view; and 
(5) to enforce this regime by an ultimate power to cut off 
the licensee from any use whatever (including uses that offend 
no regulation) by a cancellation or nonrenewal of the license, 
without which it is a federal crime to operate. 45 
547 
In comparison with this arrangement, the Florida Supreme 
Court had found the Florida statute mild.46 In the United States 
Supreme Court, moreover, the Red Lion precedent was the very 
center of the Tornillo briefs and oral arguments. In the Tornillo 
opinion, however, Red Lion is not even cited. That omission, and 
the failure of the Court to discuss, to distinguish, or even to 
acknowledge Red Lion, Professor Schmidt finds to be appallingY 
Others, more cynical than Professor Schmidt, may find pointless 
any effort to cross-cite Red Lion and to offer some discussion of 
it. For them the Supreme Court's performance in these particular 
decisions may best be explained by Fleetwood Mac's acerbic re-
frain from their best-selling single, aptly titled "Over My Head": 
Your mood is like a circus wheel, 
Changin' all the time. 
Sometimes I can't help but feel 
I'm wasting all of my time.4s 
Whether one disagrees with such flippancies (or whether one 
privately believes they contain a kernel of truth), I cheerlessly 
concede that it is highly implausible anything new remains to be 
said about this subject, given the extraordinary range of comment 
it has already evoked. 49 Yet there is such an obvious tension be-
45. Id. 
46. See 287 So. 2d at 78. 
47. B. ScHMIDT, supra note 27, at 227-31. 
48. Copyrighted by Gentoo Music, Inc., 1975. Used by permission. 
49. The professional literature on Red Lion and Tornillo (principally on Red Lion) is 
extensive. The following sources provide a comprehensive treatment of the subject, but 
even this listing is by no means exhaustive: J. BARRON, supra note 21; Z. CHAFEE, supra 
note 41; T. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 653-71; F. FRIENDLY, supra note 14; W. HOCKING, 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLE, (1947); B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FiRST AMENDMENT (1975); Barrow, 
supra note 30; Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: 
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tween Tornillo and Red Lion that one cannot help being fasci-
nated. The more one thinks about it, the more one is likely to 
appreciate the appropriateness of the metaphor which I have bor-
rowed to conclude this introduction and to title this lecture. It is · 
a metaphor suggested by a Duke law student, Wilson Parker, who 
described the conundrum of these cases as follows: "Deriving a 
consistent theory of the First Amendment from the myriad opin-
ions of the Supreme Court represents a task similar to defining 
the inside and outside of a Mobius strip; that which appears 
logical at one point evaporates from another perspective."50 
II. THE TROUBLE WITH REo LION: ONE LoNG BooTSTRAP 
Four years after the unanimous decision in Red Lion, a dis-
senter appeared. In CBS v. Democratic National Committee Mr. 
Justice Douglas voiced his dissent to Red Lion, a case in which 
he had not participated. It is, I think, a fitting starting place for 
a brief critical review. It ties in powerfully with the Supreme 
Court's unanimous position in Tornillo. It also reflects the sea-
soned view of the longest tenured Justice in the history of the 
Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 447 (1968); Bazelon, FCC Regula-
tion of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213; Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's New Clothes, 23 FED. CoM. B.J. 75 (1969); 
Bollinger, supra note 34; Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Televi-
sion Broadcasting: Social and Economic Issues, 41 LAND EcoN. 161 (1965); Coase, The 
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1959); Emerson, Colonial Inten-
tions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, supra note 31; Emerson, Legal 
Foundations of the Right to Know, supra note 31; Freund, The Great Disorder of Speech, 
44 AM. SCHOLAR 541 (1975); Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflec-
tions on Fairness and Access, 85 HARv. L. REV. 768 (1972); Jaffe, The Fairness Doctrine, 
Equal Time, Reply to Personal Attacks, and the Local Service Obligation: Implications 
of Technological Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 550 (1968); Kalven, supra note 35; Karst, 
supra note 36; Lange, supra note 22; Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary 
Duty in Broadcasting, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 278 (1969); Powe, supra note 33; Robin-
son, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Televi-
sion Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967); Schiro, Diversity in Television's Speech: 
Balancing Programs in the Eyes of the Viewer, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 336 (1976); 
Simmons, supra note 6; Note, Constitutional Ramifications of a Repeal of the Fairness 
Doctrine, 64 GEo. L.J. 1293 (1976); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 
HARV. L. REv. 701 (1964); Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory 
of Media Regulations, supra note 37; Comment, The Fairness Doctrine: Time for the 
Graveyard?, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 563 (1974); Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to 
Present Controversial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARv. C.R.-
C.L.L. REv. 137 (1975); Comment, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Fairness 
Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 727 (1974); Bollinger, Book Review, 
76 CoLUM. L. REV. 1354 (1976). 
50. W. Parker, Class Exercise (unpublished paper in partial fulfillment of seminar 
requirement at Duke University Law School) (unavailable). 
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Supreme Court, a view ruggedly skeptical of any government 
action abridging speech for the alleged common good. It has a 
clear and admirable standard to which most of us might want to 
repair. Mr. Justice Douglas stated: 
My conclusion is that TV and radio stand in the same protected 
position under the First Amendment as do newspapers and 
magazines . ... 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, ... in a 
carefully written opinion that was built upon predecessor cases, 
put TV and radio under a different regime. I did not participate 
in that decision and, with all respect, would not support it. The 
Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment regime. 
It puts the head of the camel inside the tent and enables admin-
istration after administration to toy with TV or radio in order 
to serve its sordid or its benevolent ends. 
. . . Both TV and radio news broadcasts frequently tip the 
news one direction or another and even try to turn a public 
figure into a character of disrepute. Yet so do the newspapers 
and the magazines and other segments of the press. The stan-
dards of TV, radio, newspapers, or magazines-whether of ex-
cellence or mediocrity-are beyond the reach of Government. 
. . . The First Amendment is written in terms that are 
absolute. Its command is that "Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." 
. . . The ban of "no" law that abridges freedom of the press 
is in my view total and complete. . . . 
... [T]he daily papers now established are unique in the 
sense that it would be virtually impossible for a competitor to 
enter the field due to the financial exigencies of this era. The 
result is that in practical terms the newspapers and magazines, 
like TV and radio, are available only to a select few. Who at this 
time would have the folly to think he could combat the New 
York Times or the Denver Post by building a new plant and 
becoming a competitor? That may argue for a redefinition of 
responsibility of the press in First Amendment terms. . . . 
But the prospect of putting Government in a position of 
control over publishers is to me an appalling one, even to the 
extent of the Fairness Doctrine. The struggle for liberty has been 
a struggle against Government. The essential scheme of our 
Constitution and Bill of Rights was to take go~ernment off the 
backs of people. Separation of powers was one device. An inde-
pendent judiciary was another device. The Bill of Rights was 
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still another. And it is anathema to the First Amendment to 
allow Government any role of censorship over newspapers, mag-
azines, books, art, music, TV, radio, or any other aspect of the 
press. There is unhappiness in some circles at the impotence of 
Government. But if there is to be a change, let it come by consti-
tutional amendment. The Commission [i.e., the FCC] has an 
important role to play in curbing monopolistic practices, in 
keeping channels free from interference, in opening up new 
channels as technology develops. But it has , no power of 
censorship. 51 
If one agrees with Mr. Justice Douglas with regard to news-
papers (as the Court does in Tornillo, and as I do52) then how is 
the Court to answer him with regard to radio and television? The 
answer sought to be provided by the Court is offered in Red Lion 
itself. That answer is ... scarcity. 
The peculiar "scarcity" which allegedly ·distinguishes radio 
and television from newspapers is not economic scarcity-that is, 
that it may cost a great deal to start up a broadcast station-but 
literal scarcity. No matter how much capital one might need to 
amass, given enough dollars any person, group, or enterprise 
could field a handbill, brochure, or newspaper of its own in any 
community wholly without regard to the number of handbills, 
brochures, or newspapers already under the control of others. 
Whatever one's fortune, however, for most significant markets in 
the United States, there is no way one could put together an 
additional functioning VHF television station. To be 
"functioning," it must be able to transmit intelligible signals. 
With all usable frequencies already assigned, unless one buys a 
signal already in use, commandeers it, or simply presumes to 
treat it like a noman's land and broadcasts over a frequency 
already in use, one is out of luck. 
The Great Speckled Bird may not displace the Atlanta 
Constitution in Carter Country, but nothing restrains it from 
trying; nothing restrains it from competing in that market for 
sympathetic ideologies of its own and, by enlisting them, moving 
on to enlist appropriately avaricious advertisers as well. A pro-
posed "WGSB," however, may not be able to compete at all. 
51. CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148-62 (1973) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
52. See Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 
28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977). 
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Other operatives may already sit astride the only usable frequen-
cies. 
If, then, freedom of speech and of the press is ordinarily 
protected because we are fully committed to the proposition that 
the best test of truth is the power of an idea to win acceptance in 
the competition of the market-rather than through any authori-
tative selection by government-the peculiarity of a technologi-
cally restricted market does seem to make a difference. There is 
no a priori reason to suppose that WGSB's version of truth could 
not be hyped with sufficient appeal to woo the willing ears of 
radio fans from whatever station to which they are currently at-
tuned. Yet WGSB cannot slip even the equivalent of an aural 
handbill into an FM wave band already appropriated by others 
by courtesy of the government. If, under these circumstances, the 
current oligopolists of the Atlanta FM airwaves were themselves 
at liberty to crusade incessantly against all that WGSB may be-
lieve to be holy, with no chance even for the most willing FM 
listener to hear WGSB's version, what kind of a first amendment 
would it be? 
Thus, it is argued, the first amendment need not be con-
strued to tolerate a guaranteed hegemony for local media incum-
bents. Indeed, if the airwaves were regulated in this manner the 
government would itself be implicated as an active agent in the 
skewing of the ideological marketplace. 53 That would be the net 
effect of a federal licensing agency that grants exclusive licenses 
to those left free to broadcast their own propaganda and that 
declines to switch the license to WGSB from time to time, or to 
require an incumbent to vacate its frequencies at designated 
times so that a WGSB may have some chance to gather its own 
fans (and profits), or at least to impose some minimum program 
obligations on current licensees insuring some presentation of is-
sues and views of concern to someone other than the licensees 
themselves. 
As it is, all that the FCC does is to impose a minimum 
fiduciary duty on each incumbent licensee: not restraining it from 
taking extreme positions, not requiring any general release time 
to third parties, brlt merely requiring it to provide some program 
fare reflecting the fact of public issues deemed controver-
sial-issues to which WGSB might have liked to speak. In the 
53. See Note, Constitutional Ramifications of a Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, 64 
GEo. L.J. 1293 (1976). 
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course of treating those issues, the FCC requires a licensee to 
provide some mild, albeit not equal, representation of points of 
view other than its own, with a limited right of reply to those who 
are disparaged. 
On this basis it is not so surprising that Tornillo omitted to 
cite or to discuss Red Lion. These cases are respectively addressed 
to such obviously distinguishable situations as to need no com-
parison. The separate basis of Red Lion was, very much in the 
terms already noted, made quite clear in the Red Lion opinion: 
The lack of know-how and equipment may keep many from the 
air, but only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intellig-
ence can hope to communicate by radio at the same time if 
intelligible communication is to be had, even if the entire radio 
spectrum is utilized in the present state of commercially accept-
able technology. 
It was this fact, and the chaos which ensued from permit-
ting anyone to use any frequency at whatever power level he 
wished, which made necessary the enactment of the Radio Act 
of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934. . . . 
Where there are substantially more individuals who want 
to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to 
posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast 
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or 
publish .... 
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Govern-
ment's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate 
claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain 
access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold 
the regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by 
statute and constitutional.54 
Most of those supportive of Red Lion agree, moreover, that the 
literal scarcity distinction is both necessary and sufficient to 
sustain the case alongside Tornillo. 55 
54. 395 U.S. 367, 388, 400·01 (footnotes omitted). 
55. In Red Lion, the Court itself disclaimed other grounds for sustaining the fairness 
doctrine. 395 U.S. at 401 n.28. The scarcity argument as a basis for validating FCC speech-
content regulations was approved in dicta by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in NBC v. FCC, 319 
U.S. 190, 226 (1943), and relied upon in Red Lion. It is reiterated in CBS v. Democratic 
Nat' I Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See also National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. 
FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977). It is relied upon by the FCC in its 1974 Report, In 
re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest 
Standards of the Communications Act, 30 RAn. REG. 2d (P & F) at 1270 (July 12, 1974). 
1978] REo LION 553 
The difficulty with this seemingly persuasive explanation of 
the first amendment propriety of the basic FCC speech-content 
rules is that it may have been pulled up entirely by its own 
bootstrap, a point made a number of years ago by Ronald Coase. 56 
Coase acknowledged the plausible consistency of most FCC regu-
lations once one makes the correct factual observations about the 
consequences of the Radio Act of 1927: the establishment of gov-
ernment monopoly ownership of the airwaves and the allocation 
of exclusive private licenses with indifference to market pricing. 
Given that the airwaves are characterized as "owned" by the 
public for whom the FCC then acts to ration its private use con-
sistent with the public interest, nearly all else follows logically: 
(1) Insofar as the award of a license extends to a licensee 
a portion of publicly owned property without regard to any 
bargained-for consideration, it would be a constitutional dere-
liction by the FCC so to appropriate to private use portions of 
this public domain without any requirement that the persons so 
Judge Bazelon, a principal critic of the doctrine, finds that the scarcity argument is the 
only basis for the FCC speech-content regulations. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. 
v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 
922 (1973). Professor Freund finds it necessary and sufficient. Freund, The Great Disorder 
of Speech, 44 AM. ScHOLAR 541 (1975). Professor Friendly relies upon it exclusively. F. 
FRIENDLY, supra note 14, at 192, 212, 217, 236. Professor Emerson is essentially of the same 
view. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, supra note 31, at 9; Emerson, 
Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, supra note 49, at 752. 
Professor Schmidt appears to embrace it. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 27. The scarcity argu-
ment is also most relied upon as the underlying rationale of the FCC regime in the 
following: CHAFEE, supra note 41; Lange, supra note 22, at 6-7, 65; Note, Concepts of the 
Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal, 47 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 83,88-89 (1972); Note, Newspaper Regulation and the Public Interest: The 
Unmasking of a Myth, 32 U. PIIT. L. "REv. 595, 601-03 (1971). 
Compare the observation of Justice Brennan in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: 
The opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS rightly refrain from relying 
on the notion of "spectrum scarcity" to support their result. As Chief Judge 
Bazelon noted below, "although scarcity has justified increasing the diversity 
of speakers and speech, it has never been held to justify censorship." 556 F.2d, 
at 29 (emphasis in original). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 396 (1969). 
46 U.S.L.W. 5018, 5029 n.4 (July 3, 1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
56. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 49; Coase, 
Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and 
Economic Issues, supra note 49. Very strong criticism of the underpinnings of the scarcity 
rationale is also found in B. OWEN, supra note 49, at 90-92, 103-08 (1975); Bollinger, supra 
note 34; DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Alloca-
tion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 1499 (1969) [hereinafter cited as DeVany]; Bollinger, supra note 34; Powe, supra 
note 33; Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regula-
tion, supra note 37. 
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subsidized acknowledge a duty to satisfy the public interest in 
consideration of the subsidy thus provided. 
(2) Insofar as the FCC license insulates a licensee from 
direct competition by guaranteeing him exclusive use of one of 
a limited number of frequencies, the insulating involvement of 
the government itself generates a first amendment duty to in-
sure that the joint venture-of FCC and licensee-does not skew 
the ideological marketplace. Such skewing may inevitably 
occur, however, unless the FCC enforces at least certain specific 
affirmative obligations such as programmatic offerings fairly 
reflective of proportionate community interests, affirmative 
fairness treatment of differing views respecting issues of public 
concern, opportunity for reply by persons singled out for criti-
cism in the course of treating such issues, and equal access for 
every candidate. Indeed, even with things as they are, one pro-
perly may be uneasy about whether the operation of any or all 
radio and TV stations even crudely approximates an ideologi-
cally fair forum. 
That all of this is but a "bootstrap," however, becomes quite 
clear from a comparison with the utterly different mode by which 
rights and uses of other equally scarce resources are deter-
mined-a mode which neither necessitates nor tolerates a regime 
like that of the FCC. The most cogent comparison is that of land. 
Beginning with the consolidation of estates during the late 
Middle Ages, it was the prevailing law in England and in much 
of Europe that the several lords owned the lands. Those who 
occupied these lands were permitted to use it on sufferance of 
various kinds of service such as socage, scutage, or knight's serv-
ice. The occupants did not have title to the land,' however, and 
clearly could not presume to transfer any part of it, whether by 
sale, gift, testamentary device, or any other means; the land was 
not theirs to dispose of personally. 
In the course of consolidation, the law developed that the 
king owned all the land, each lord owing fealty to the king and 
each himself being something of a grand tenant. Nothing would 
have been illogical (and indeed many believe it would have been 
far better) had the notion of "private" property never developed 
any further. In contemporary terms, land would be properly de-
scribed as a "scarce resource." Clearly it is not infinitely avail-
able, it is not a "free good," and clearly certain unalterably fixed 
pieces of land are more valuable than others, favored by their 
market location and by other accidental circumstance. 
As parliamentary forms of governmment gradually displaced 
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monarchic government, moreover, nothing necessarily had to 
change in terms of the legal incapacity of individuals or enter-
prises ever to acquire ownership of land. Instead Parliament, and 
in this country Congress, would be said to be the instrument of 
the people, rather than simply the legislative council of the king 
as it was previously described. The government itself would own 
all real property and, as is the duty of the government in respect 
to any publicly held scarce resource, it would be viewed as being 
bound to administer property in accordance with "the public 
interest." 
It scarcely seems necessary to trace the implications of this 
scenario, because it is already clear what would happen: literally 
everything urged in respect to the "publicly owned" airwaves, the 
FCC, and the first amendment, would apply identically to the 
"publicly owned" land. Most assuredly is this true of its literal 
scarcity. Rather, it is only because the legal devices used in re-
spect to land have been so vastly different from those represented 
by the FCC that we unthinkingly suppose that there must be 
some intrinsic differences. 
Consider again the alleged uniqueness of the airwaves: 
(1) There are only so many of them; that is, a limited 
number of usable frequencies. Obviously this is true also of land. 
There is a limited usable surface which, like the airwaves, may 
be cut into larger or smaller parcels (each to be "licensed" for a 
term to a particular party?). 
(2) Unless regulated in some way, broadcast communica-
tion would be utter chaos; for example, it would suffer from 
overlapping signals in overlapping markets. No one could be 
heard since each would be fatally dependent upon the noninter-
ference of others. Obviously this is true also ofland-both in the 
immediate sense that others could commandeer the same plot 
unless exclusivity of possession is assured by law and, in the 
larger sense, that incompatible uses of adjoining plots must be 
restrained in order for each possessor to be able to make any 
particular use of his own plot. For example, persons unre-
strained in the volume of noise they might issue from "their" 
land would manifestly make it impossible for persons to conduct 
their own speech activity even within "their" land. 
(3) Some frequencies in some locations are immensely 
more valuable than other frequencies in other locations. This is 
obviously true in equal measure of land. 
( 4) Some markets are wholly saturated, even if others still 
have available channels. This is equally true of land. Insofar as 
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parcels of land might be treated like governmentally issued seg-
ments of the airwaves, and nonassignable term licenses issued, 
there would be more persons "standing in line" to apply for 
"free" licenses in certain markets than there would be parcels 
to issue to them at any one time. 
The more interesting point of comparison is that, notwith-
standing these similarities, the legal devices that apply to land 
and to free speech are utterly different from the regime applicable 
to the airwaves in spite of the erroneous assertion that the regime 
applicable to the airwaves was simply unavoidable. Notice, for 
instance, how differently "similar" problems are resolved in the 
following cases: 
(1) X owns a movie house, and Y attempts to show a movie 
in X's theater without X's permission. X does not go to an FLCC 
[Federal Land Control Commission] for relief from such tres-
pass. Rather, he files a private civil action for damages or injunc-
tive relief, or both, he summons the police to enforce the criminal 
trespass law, or he uses limited self-help to eject Y. 
(2) X operates his theater with so loud a speaker system or 
with such thin walls that he interferes with persons frequenting 
another nearby theater, book store, or department store. Those 
seeking relief from X's abuse of his property do not go to the 
FLCC for relief. Rather, they file suit for damages, injunction, or 
both, or they summon the police to enforce such ordinances as 
may regulate excessive noise that unreasonably interferes with 
their own land uses, or they may do both. 
(3) Y believes that X is not presenting those movies clearly 
in the best public interest and Y wants to stop X from further 
exhibitions that, in Y's view, are contrary to the public interest. 
Y cannot now go to an FLCC. Instead, he must be able to demon-
strate which law X is violating and he must be prepared to 
demonstrate that any such law is itself not forbidden by the first 
amendment. 
(4) Y believes that, if the state transfers X's land site to 
him, Y would exhibit motion pictures more in the public interest 
than those that X has been exhibiting. If there were an FLCC, 
he might, at "license renewal time," have a good case. As it is, 
he has the same difficulty as in case (3) above; even supposing 
he is able to find a statute granting him the relief he seeks, the 
statute is certain to be held violative of the first amendment. 
(5) Y would like to offer the public something "better" than 
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what he believes X offers the public, but Y is unable to do so for 
one or more of the following reasons: 
(a) Y is without sufficient funds to buy land and to build 
a theater; 
(b) the land and buildings available in the relevant mar-
ket of Y's interest are very high priced, and no one is willing to 
sell to him at what he personally would regard as a reasonable 
price; 
(c) the only theater Y can afford to buy or build would 
not, in any event, be as favorably located from the public's point 
of view as X's theater, so that in fact Y would be able to serve 
only that part of the public interest represented by persons suffi-
ciently interested and wealthy to pay the cost of coming out to 
his theater (similar to those people able to afford more compli-
cated radio and TV receivers that pull in additional, more re-
mote, signals). 
So, what can Y do in this last case? Assuming no antitrust 
issues are involved, the answer as of now is nothing. While many 
people may be separately concerned (rightly so) with the maldis-
tribution of wealth, it is surely doubtful that they would endorse 
the notion that the proper solution is to set up a government 
agency, with power to review X's movies from time to time and 
to "nonrenew" his license in favor of another whenever, by its 
conscientious standards, X defaults on "the public interest" by 
exhibiting motion pictures portraying but one perspective. 
Thus far, nothing has been said in the land use case, inciden-
tally, about how X came to be owner of his motion picture thea-
ter. Indeed, in most discussions of X's first amendment rights 
nothing would be said about the matter, because it would be 
considered constitutionally irrelevant. But because such matters 
are sometimes thought to make a critical difference in discussions 
of the airwaves, we may consider it for just a moment. Suppose, 
then, that 
(1) X acquired the theater as a result of his own frugal 
savings during thirty years of hard work, paying an arms-length, 
bargained-for price to the previous owner; 
(2) X acquired it from windfall gains from a lucky day at 
the track; 
(3) X acquired it by borrowing from a bank, with the loan 
secured by a mortgage on the property, expecting to repay the 
principal and interest from future profits; 
(4) X acquired it by forming a corporation, selling stock, 
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and using the proceeds to purchase the theater as "X, Inc."; 
(5) X acquired it at public auction from the city (for 
which the land and building were surplus property) by being the 
highest bidder in competitive, sealed-bid proceedings; or 
(6) X acquired it at a public lottery from the city (like 
some of the western land lotteries in the past century), as a 
lucky ticket holder. 
For first amendment purposes, Y will be no more successful 
in displacing X under a claim that, if given the theater, he would 
program "better" movies, irrespective of the origins of X 's owner-
ship. In like fashion, the extent to which a party originally might 
have been a windfall acquirer of an "ownable" airwave segment 
(and incidentally might have sold at once to an arms-length pur-
chaser who paid full market value) makes no difference, if it is 
assumed, as is true here, that the lottery itself was not rigged by 
limiting the participants to those who were ideologically accepta-
ble to the government. 
If, but only if, the government were the owner (as it might 
have been, had it acquired the theater literally by escheat if the 
previous owner had died without a will and without heirs) and the 
government were also determined neither to sell the theater nor 
to give it away by random lottery, but was determined instead to 
license its use to X, then we would, in that instance, at last have 
to consider what first amendment duties may be imposed upon 
X. Under these circumstances, X would indeed be involved in 
some important sense as a joint venturer with the government 
itself. But it is with the mere fact of just this type of relationship, 
rather than with a demonstration of the necessity or propriety of 
that relationship, that nearly all rationalizations of FCC speech-
content controls have begun. 
The difficulty is, however, that it is with the assumed necess-
ity or propriety of this most peculiar relationship that our funda-
mental questions should begin. Offered as a reason which ex-
plains the propriety of FCC speech-content regulations, the bare 
fact of the FCC's relationship with licensees provides wholly cir-
cular reasoning: because the government insists upon its owner-
ship monopoly of the airwaves (which no one has shown to be 
essential) and because it insists upon a system of exclusive joint 
ventures with preferred licensees, so also may it go forward to 
impose affirmative speech-use controls over each of those wind-
fall, term licensees. The result of imposing identical affirmative 
duties on every licensee, moreover, is the tendency to field a 
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replicated series of similarly "balanced" speech uses throughout 
the FCC system-in contrast with a more diverse and competi-
tive array of privately owned stations that would be fully subject 
to antitrust laws but otherwise as editorially free as newspapers. 
As one might suggest in remembering the different legal 
order that regulates land, it is quite clear that the choice made 
by government is not necessarily one of "either/or." That is, it is 
not a question that the government must own all of the airwaves 
or that it must own none of them. Neither is it a question that, 
assuming the government will continue to own all of the airwaves, 
either it must charge full market price for all licenses in every 
market (and, accordingly, leave each licensee strictly alone) or it 
must charge no licensee anything in any market (and, accord-
ingly, should continue to impose compensatory speech regula-
tions of an identical kind on each licensee). Without doubt, reser-
vation could be made of the equivalents to public parks and 
streets-people's forums in each community (as in Hague v. 
C/057)-with access rights as constitutionally free as the first 
amendment already well provides actual streets and parks. It 
may also be noteworthy concerning streets and parks that the 
first amendment presumably would void any rule authorizing 
that a permit be refused because the applicant represents a point 
of view previously presented in the same park a week earlier, or 
that he will not furnish a pledge to be balanced in his presenta-
tion. 
There is, in short, no self-evident necessity why the eclecti-
cism of the full property metaphor, some private and some pub-
lic, is any less applicable or feasible for the airwaves. That this 
arrangement might actually provide some equivalents to the 
Great Speckled Bird (as well as the Manchester Union Leader) 
-it might provide some broadcasters with an idiosyncrasy, a 
strong coloration, and an indulged "unfairness" of their own, 
and do so in markets which it is preposterous to regard as truly 
captive or victim of any one station-is surely not to be feared. 
Mter all, that is what one should expect of a free press. That 
is what is assumed in the first amendment itself. The vague 
pastels of the "public interest" as required by the "fairness" regu-
lations of the FCC may be easier on the eyes, one may argue, but 
they are surely a great deal less interesting. They may also be a 
great deal further removed from the model of a truly diverse, 
57. 307 u.s. 496 (1939). 
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robust, competitive ideological marketplace, free from govern-
ment licensing, that animated the first amendment. 
But in any case, the bootstrap of Red Lion does seem to be 
showing: because Congress chose to regulate the airwaves as it 
did, the FCC does not act unconstitutionally in presuming to 
regulate broadcasters as it does. 
III. DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT "ENACT" A SYSTEM OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY? 
In retrospect, it appears that Red Lion may in fact have 
proceeded too swiftly. By supposing that the scarcity of usable 
frequencies was "unique," Red Lion supposed also that this al-
leged uniqueness dictated a ·system of government monopoly 
ownership. After supposing the appropriateness of that owner-
ship, it supposed also that, given the limited number of usable 
frequencies in any particular area, nothing other than the imposi-
tion of affirmative licensee obligations could offset the unfairness 
to those unable to hold licenses of their own. If the relative physi-
cal scarcity of usable frequencies does not require either basic 
feature of the FCC regime, however-if it does not require con-
tinuing government ownership of all airwaves or if continuing 
government ownership need not require allocation by speech-
content criteria as the sole means of compensating those disad-
vantaged by the subsidized value of the license awarded to licen-
sees-then the rationale of the FCC standards may fail when once 
again challenged on first amendment grounds. 
The basis for this new challenge is as bold as it is straightfor-
ward. It begins with the Court's own observations in Tornillo and 
moves at once from the principles of that case to the application 
of other, reasonably well-settled first amendment principles. In 
fact, we have already canvassed it. Briefly it is, again, as follows. 
The requirement that a licensee devote any portion of his 
broadcast time to issues or to subjects not of his own selection 
perforce restricts his own freedom of speech in a way that cannot 
be reconciled with Tornillo. The additional requirement that he 
ventilate views that would undermine the force of his own view, 
or such views as he alone prefers to present on his station, is a 
similar restriction equally repugnant to Tornillo. That he must 
yield his station for the presentation of such matters at his own 
expense and that he must also supply a free forum for personal 
replies by those whom he has permitted to be criticized, is more 
of the same: they all directly abridge the licensee's "editorial 
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control and judgment," and are inconsistent with Tornillo. If a 
way can be found to allocate the airwaves, a way that would itself 
be less restrictive of licensee discretion and that would simultane-
ously wholly eliminate any governmentally conferred advantage 
the licensee derives from the protected nature of his exclusive 
license, then the first amendment itself requires the selection of 
that way. If this argument is sound, then only one question re-
mains: given the scarcity of the airwaves, is there no alternative 
for a rational allocation process other than the current one in 
which the award of a license necessarily involves a degree of fed-
eral subsidy secured at the expense of the free speech interests of 
others and demanding the kind of access or representation rights 
currently established by the FCC's speech-content regulations? 
· It is said that there is such an alternative; even consistent 
with government ownership of the airwaves, it is altogether feasi-
ble to allocate licenses by a market-pricing mechanism that 
awards each usable frequency to the highest bidder with the gov-
ernment remaining absolutely neutral in passing any judgment 
whatever on the value of the proposed program fare. Whatever he 
wants to feature, the highest bidder-applicant would take all the 
risks that his own proposed uses may or may not be successful in 
attracting audiences and sponsors. Competitive sealed bid 
awards of channels and of frequencies would involve no govern-
mental approval or judgment or endorsement or subsidy of any 
licensee's program fare. Insofar as a given license is valuable be-
cause it is one of but several in a given market and because that 
market is an excellent one, the licensee will have paid fully for 
that value just as would be true if he had bid successfully on one 
of but a few possible theaters in a given town. In neither instance 
is there any need to use a speech-content standard in awarding 
the license. In neither is the licensee favored by government over 
others by reason of his program intentions. Accordingly, or so it 
is argued, the justification for imposing speech restrictions on 
his use of that license, for which he will have paid top dollar, 
collapses. 
The argument is built on a creditable foundation of Supreme 
Court cases that do indeed hold that the first amendment obliges 
government to cope with a given social problem by electing from 
among feasible alternatives that which is least speech-
re~trictive. 58 As applied to this situation, a straightforward ver-
58. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), in which the court said: 
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sion of the argument has been reiterated very recently in the 
Stanford Law Review: 
These proposals generally suggest that economic competition be 
substituted for FCC regulation, and that allocation of the spec-
trum be performed by recognizing private property rights in the 
spectrum, exchanged according to property and contract law 
and enforced at private initiative in the courts, rather than by 
government rationing to those whom it considers worthy. This 
regulatory strategy would remove the government from direct 
determination of the particular individuals who are allowed to 
broadcast, leaving this decision to market forces, and would 
avoid the need for specific behavioral commands and sanctions 
now necessary to secure compliance by broadcasters with the 
various obligations imposed by the public interest stan-
dard .... Under strict scrutiny, then, the existence of this 
clearly identifiable less restrictive alternative indicates that the 
Communications Act is unconstitutional.59 
The argument is appealing, but it is based on a fatal myopia 
in its failure to see how clearly freedom of speech is also abridged 
by a government policy that adheres only to a private property 
system and a market-pricing mechanism in determining who 
shall be able to speak. Insofar as the emphasis is upon maximiz-
ing the free speech of broadcasters, consistent with some imper-
sonal mode by government to allocate broadcast frequencies, the 
proposal almost certainly is a feasible, less speech-restrictive al-
ternative to the current regime. Insofar as the "problem" is max-
imizing freedom of speech in general, however, the proposal is by 
no means clearly the least speech-restrictive alternative. This is 
so simply because the choice of the option to go to a pure, or even 
to a mixed, market mechanism is itself a choice that is more 
speech-restrictive insofar as it winnows the field of otherwise eli-
gible applicants strictly according to their ability to pay; it elimi-
nates from the licensing competition those who lack dollars to put 
in an effective bid.59•1 
In a series of decisions this court has held that, even though the governmen-
tal purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by 
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed 
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 
59. Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regula-
tion, supra note 37, at 583. Similar observations are offered by Bollinger, Coase, DeVany, 
and Owen, each cited supra note 56. 
59.1 F:or a persuasive statement of the reasons why a bid auction system might 
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The regime of the FCC subsidizes speech by making possible 
the presentation of some material which presumably would not 
command as much advertiser interest as the material it displaces. 
To put the airwaves entirely up for competitive bidding would 
simply insure that material would go unspoken on the airwaves, 
since a bidder who contemplated using such material would be 
constrained to submit a bid lower than the bidder who is a pure 
profit maximizer. A purely competitive bid or other market-
pricing allocative mechanism therefore would not necessarily be 
overall the least speech-restrictive means. 
To say that the use of such a mechanism might itself not 
violate the first amendment is far from saying that therefore any 
other mechanism does violate the first amendment. Congress 
may indeed be free to "sell off' the airwaves, and it may be 
wholly feasible to allocate most currently established broadcast 
signals by competitive bidding that, when done, may well pro-
duce private licensees operating truly without subsidy. But only 
a singularly insensitive observer would believe that this choice is 
not implicitly also a highly speech-restrictive choice by Congress. 
It is fully as speech-restrictive as though, in the case of land, 
government were to withdraw from all ownership and all subsi-
dized maintenance of all land, including parks, auditoriums, and 
streets and to remain in the field exclusively as a policeman to 
enforce the proprietary decisions of all private landowners. 
Unless, then, the first amendment enacts a system of free 
speech only for those who can compete with dollars-in other 
words, unless the first amendment enacts an exclusive free mar-
ket system of private property-it cannot be maintained that the 
feasibility of such a system, as an alternative mode of airwave 
rationing or allocation, is less speech-restrictive. It is, implicitly, 
highly speech-restrictive. 
One may also address the bid-auction proposals for airwave 
allocation from still another perspective that yields the same con-
clusion. This perspective is supplied by a specific profile of "state 
action" cases60 that help us to understand how ostensibly imper-
sonal policies of government nonetheless deeply implicate the 
nonetheless be as egalitarian as the current system in view of actual FCC practices, 
however, see Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regula-
tory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 240-43 (1978). 
60. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (structuring of state law to 
encourage private discrimination held invalid); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 u.s. 715 (1961). 
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government in the shaping of private decisions that, ordinarily, 
are not themselves subject to the first amendment. 
Under any competitive bid-auction method for leasing desig-
nated frequencies, the government at once becomes entangled as 
a recipient and as an inducer of highly restrictive "speech rents." 
The government will profit from speech-use restrictions imposed 
by its own lessees who, by imposing these restrictions, are able 
to pay the higher rent reflected in the successful bid they submit 
to secure their franchise. And here, too, it is the government's 
own bid-auction allocative policy that operates to encourage such 
restrictive broadcast policies on the part of its rent-paying licen-
sees. 
In both respects, the government's position is quite indistin-
guishable from that of the state-as-arms-length-lessor in Burton 
v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 61 There, as Mr. Justice Clark 
observed, 82 the difficulty was not that the State was subsidizing 
the lessee. Rather, if one assumes that the lessee truly paid full 
market value, not only for use of the premises but for any tax 
advantages that went along with the lease, that fact simply con-
firmed the government's own role as an active encourager and 
principal beneficiary of "race rents." The allocative (profit-
maximizing) policy of the State was itself an active influence in 
shaping an entrepreneurial policy to exclude minority persons 
insofar as their presence might result in a net loss of customers 
or a net loss of revenue from which the entrepreneur must pay his 
rent to the State. In the actual case, the presence of this State 
participation in the enterprise of the lessee was deemed sufficient 
to apply the fourteenth amendment directly to the lessee himself. 
The duty of the state under these circumstances is quite clear: to 
forego such additional revenue as it may receive as a consequence 
of racially exclusionary practices by its lessee, and to require, 
instead, that its lessee forbear from a race-restrictive policy. 
The same argument can be made in our own case as well. An 
FCC licensee, additionally induced by the government's own 
profit-maximization policy to shape his broadcast policies tore-
fuse time or to forbear from programs insofar as the subject or the 
sponsorship would adversely affect his capacity to pay his rent or 
his capacity to offer the highest amount in rent, is himself 
61. 365 u.s. 715 (1961). 
62. Id. at 724. Compare Mr. Justice Rehnquist's attempt to limit and to distinguish 
Burton partly on this basis in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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"answerable" to the first amendment access claims of others.83 A 
government that structures airwave restrictions in this fashion, 
moreover, may be required to restructure them in some alterna-
tive fashion that is less speech-suppressive than that resulting 
from a bid-auction system. 
Finally, the basic point will not be altered even if govern-
ment, whether by sale, by lottery, or by some other device, were 
to take the last step; that is, even if it were to release the airwaves 
outright into the untrammeled market place of private enterprise. 
To be sure, government would thereafter no longer be involved at 
all except in its purely traditional role as "policeman" who stands 
willing to enforce the "rights" of the several private owners. And, 
to be sure, as each owner arrives at his own broadcast policy free 
of any participation by government, whether direct or oblique, 
neither is he answerable to the first amendment-any more than 
was the Miami Herald in the Tornillo case. The fact remains, 
however, that at the juncture of deciding whether to release the 
airwaves in this fashion, the government is still deciding. And, 
insofar as among its several choices, the choice to release the 
airwaves into private hands contemplates that each of these air-
waves may thereafter be severely restricted by the policies of its 
new owners, through program content or through the acceptabil-
ity of certain sponsors, the critical decision is one that itself con-
templates more restrictive uses of each frequency than is cur-
rently tolerated. Given the inevitable competitive pressures that 
may themselves induce profit-maximization program policies by 
private owners (again, policies tending to eliminate less popular 
subjects and unpopular sponsors), the proximate consequence is 
an overall system that in vital respects is even more speech-
suppressive than what we currently have. This being so, it cannot 
be held that the first amendment itself compels such a decision 
by government. 
N. ARE FAIRNESS STANDARDS "UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CONDITIONS"?84 
We know from Tornillo that the editorial discretion of private 
63. In Columbia Broadcasti~g System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 
(1973), the fact that the government did not give free rein to FCC licensees and that it 
did subject them to the affirmative duties of the fairness doctrine was relied upon to 
explain why an FCC licensee may not otherwise be directly answerable to the first amend-
ment. Id. at 129, 130. See also id. at 147 (White, J., concurring). 
64. For more extensive discussions of this doctrine, see Hale, Unconstitutional Condi-
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newspapers cannot be trammeled by statutory equivalents to the 
fairness doctrine, despite the superior market position of a partic-
ular newspaper, the overt partisanship of its managers, or the 
meanness of its editors in foreclosing access to those whom the 
newspaper may malign. We have been taught by other cases, 
moreover, that what government is forbidden by the Bill of Rights 
to do directly, it is also forbidden to do indirectly: that to which 
free persons cannot be made to yield when they seek nothing from 
government, they cannot be made to yield to by coercion of cir-
cumstance controlled by government. As declared a half-century 
ago in the compelling rhetoric of Mr. Justice Sutherland: 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of 
state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to 
strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitu-
tion, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accom-
plished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for 
a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to with-
hold. . . . If the state may compel the surrender of one consti-
tutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, 
compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees 
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be 
manipulated out of existence.65 
So this general doctrine, the doctrine of "unconstitutonal condi-
tions," seems to provide that a waiver of first amendment rights 
cannot be annexed to the rationing of goods or services in the 
public sector. The Bill of Rights precludes the government from 
proposing such terms and, correspondingly, from attempting to 
enforce them. 
May we claim the advantage of this doctrine, then, as an 
alternative basis for mounting a successful challenge to Red 
Lion? At first glance, it would surely seem that we may. Consis-
tent with the doctrine, we may willingly concede that the air-
waves are part of the public domain (and that no sufficient argu-
ment has been made to demonstrate that the Constitution itself 
compels their outright abandonment to private owners). Let the 
matter stand at that. Still, is it not clear that the fuller editorial 
tions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935); O'Neil, Unconstitutional 
Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Note, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another Look at 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968). 
65. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). 
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freedom, which we know government cannot deny according to 
Tornillo, is in fact emphatically denied "under the guise of a 
surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the 
state threatens otherwise to withhold"-that each applicant for 
an FCC license is compelled to yield a freedom of editorial discre-
tion that the first amendment otherwise protects? 
There is but one obstacle to the force of this argument: it, 
too, involves a bootstrap of its own and rests entirely upon a 
misapplication of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Pro-
perly understood, the doctrine merely protects preexisting rights 
from surrender-by-contract with the welfare state.66 It is limited 
to a case in which in exchange for some valuable privilege, the 
state presumes to take from the individual some measure of free-
dom previously held by that individual and still held by all oth-
ers. In the context of our problem, proper application of the doc-
trine would mean merely that an applicant for an FCC license 
who happens also to publish a newspaper cannot, as a condition 
of receiving an FCC license, be forced to observe "fairness" stan-
dards in respect to his newspaper. To permit this would permit 
"the same result [which result is forbidden by Tornillo when 
attempted directly] ... under the guise of a surrender of a right 
in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens 
otherwise to withhold."67 
On the other hand, whether the applicant can be forbidden 
to exercise the same latitude of editorial freedom on the airwaves 
that he remains constitutionally entitled to pursue in respect to 
his newspaper, cannot be answered by the unconstitutional con-
ditions argument. To say that it is so answered is simply to con-
fuse the two claims as though they were one and the same. But 
the very question we are attempting to resolve is whether FCC 
licensees stand on the same footing as newspaper publishers. It 
is not the different question of which preexisting rights, if any-
thing, newspaper publishers may be made to surrender as a con-
dition of becoming FCC licensees. . 
The case is truly no different analytically than one in which 
we ask whether the state may forbid those whom it employs as 
jailers from electioneering at the jail itself, a place from which all 
66. See discussion and citations in Note, Constitutional Problems in the Execution 
of Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 HARv. 
L. REv. 1500, 1525 (1977). 
67. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. at 593. 
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others are excluded insofar as they, too, might wish simply to 
electioneer. Assuredly we shall get nowhere in attempting to an-
swer that question by asking the wholly different question of 
whether the state could also forbid the jailer from electioneering 
at large, outside the jail and on his own time, as any private 
citizen would be free to do. The doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions presumes to answer the second question with an unquali-
fied "no"; that is, the state may not compel his surrender of that 
common right as a condition of his employment.68 Quite plainly, 
however, it says nothing about whether, now that he is also the 
jailer, he can seize the advantage of that status to electioneer in 
a place from which virtually all others are excluded. Most as-
suredly, nothing in the conservative innovation of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine was ever intended to compel so anoma-
lous a result. Identically, nothing associated with the doctrine is 
of any assistance to an FCC licensee in determining the latitude 
of his prerogatives on an airwave. 
V. THE FmsT AMENDMENT PLURALISM OF PUBLIC FoRuMs 
In dismissing the technical irrelevance of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine, I did not mean to imply that therefore 
any restriction that government might impose within a facility 
that it owns is automatically free of first amendment objections. 
Within a prison, or even within the curtilage of a jail, we are 
aware that a uniform prohibition on varieties of assembly or dem-
onstration might be sustained.69 Within a public park, however, 
68. In each of the following cases, the "right" that the individual sought to pursue, 
free from any waiver or restriction attached to some benefit or connection with govern-
ment, was a right the individual was fully capable of exercising simply as an unattached 
private citizen: Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 
(1958). 
When, however, the alleged "right" is sought to be extended into the additional 
relationship that the individual has formed with the government, the question is conven-
tionally regarded as the different question of whether a reasonable basis exists to forbid 
its exercise within that context. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See 
also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (limiting dicta); Van Alstyne, The 
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an 
Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 751 {1969). 
In adhering to the conventional wisdom on the scope of the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine, incidentally, I do not mean to express any approval of the doctrine or of 
its scope. Quite plainly, the Supreme Court has not adhered to the doctrine with any great 
consistency. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter 
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
69. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See also Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 
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the established wisdom is to the contrary; the equal protection 
clause is not the only restraint that government must respect in 
determining who goes there. Rather, though government may be 
without constitutional obligation to provide a park, once govern-
ment undertakes to do so it is as though the first amendment 
itself rushed in to fill the vacuum. While in existence, a public 
park is claimed by the first amendment which, of its own force, 
prevents government from cordoning it off from use as a forum.70 
One has a very strong impression, moreover, that even when gov-
ernment has to contend with park "allocation" problems in some 
ways analogous to those of the publicly owned airwaves, it very 
probably could not attempt to solve them through the use of rules 
at all resembling those associated with the fairness doctrine. 
Might we not, then, take a still closer look at this more famil-
iar publicly owned forum to see better whether the airwaves are 
truly so different that they warrant a kind of restriction that 
might well be stricken if anything similar were proposed for the 
rationing of park permits? That a permit (a license) may be re-
quired for park use is well established.71 That during certain peri-
ods more persons or groups may seek access to that free forum 
than the size or characteristics of the park can bear is also ob-
vious. That government may adopt virtually any kind of ration-
ing scheme pursuant to which such licenses may be allocated, 
restricted in behalf of others seeking access or limited in any other 
parliamentarily reasonable way to apportion access and use con-
sistent with the equal protection clause, also seems likely.72 But 
perhaps it is arguable, and vigorously so, that the function of all 
such restrictions, whether for parks or for airwaves, must indeed 
be merely parliamentary; that is, what may not be done (even in 
the name of equal protection) is to impose on any licensee restric-
tions that tend to deprive each person of the vitality of his own 
freedom of speech, that crush the robustness of committed 
speech, and that impose an enervating "fairness" on each indi-
828 (1976); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
70. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See also Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 
(1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 20 (1975); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. 
CT. REv. 1. 
71. Poulos v. New Hampshir!l, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). 
72. See Kalven, supra note 70, and consider Kalven's reflections on this problem in 
the specific context of the FCC in his article, supra note 35. 
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vidual speaker. That the lone haranguer must provide notice to 
third parties whom he intends to assail and yield any of his volun-
tarily assembled audience for reply time? That he must devote 
some fraction of his rhetoric to some issue of local interest or, if 
not that, at least to acknowledge the fair diversity of opinions 
arranged against the singular polemic he prefers to develop? 
Surely, after Tornillo, after Hague, 73 after Hannegan/4 and after 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 15 any such inhibiting, stultifying, 
self-abnegating genuflections on behalf of some feckless fairness 
would be swept away. Surely it was not for this that Milton, Mill, 
Holmes, and Brandeis celebrated a much more passionate per-
sonal freedom of speech. 
Perhaps it is here that we reach at last an unavoidable ten-
sion between a principle of equal protection (which it is the design 
of the fairness doctrine to serve) and a principle of free speech 
that sometimes will cause the principles to collide. In four differ-
ent and separately important ways, the administration of the 
airwaves is already highly sensitive to the equal protection princi-
ple wholly without reference to the fairness doctrine. First, it 
copes with broadcast scarcity by refusing to release the airwaves 
to the unequal rights of private property. Second, it declines to 
confer exclusive licenses by any kind of pocketbook test75·1 or by 
any kind of ideological loyalty oath. Third, it declines to provide 
a permanent hegemony even for those licensed without a fee, even 
in markets in which there are numerous rivals, many competitors 
in other media, and very little, if any, market value for the license 
they hold. And fourth, it disqualifies from licensing those already 
holding a concentration of economic power over other means of 
communication. 76 
The "fairness" doctrine, as an addition, however, differs in 
kind from all of these devices. It does so by imposing an aggregate 
of surrogate obligations the net effect of which may directly dis-
courage the licensee's own freedom of speech: the message of the 
73. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
74. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946). 
75. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
75.1 But see note 59.1 supra. 
76. Beyond or apart from these devices, it is well within the range of government 
authority even to add still other devices that would further diffuse distributive opportuni-
ties, e.g., the reservation within each market of certain frequencies exclusively as public 
channels. These, in turn, might be reserved on a first-come-first-served basis for any 
groups to provide whatever programs they see fit to offer. 
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fairness doctrine is that he must deliver his station into the hands 
of others if he presumes himself to become an advocate. That, 
after all, was the real objection in Tornillo. It remains as a genu-
ine objection to Red Lion, despite all other distinctions. 
Indeed, if one continues to be troubled by Red Lion, I think 
it is not because one takes lightly the difficulty of forum alloca-
tion in a society of scarce resources. Rather, it is because one 
believes that the technique of the fairness doctrine in particular 
may represent a very trivial egalitarian gain and a major first 
amendment loss; that a twist has been given to the equal protec-
tion idea by a device the principal effect of which is merely to 
level down the most vivid and versatile forum we have, to flatten 
it out and to render it a mere commercial mirror of each com-
munity. What may have been lost is a willingness to risk the 
partisanship of licensees as catalysts and as active advocates with 
a freedom to exhort, a freedom that dares to exclaim "Fuck the 
draft," and not be made to yield by government at once to add, 
"but on the other hand there is also the view, held by 
many .... "77 
77. Compare this somewhat diluted version of free speech with the view of the first 
amendment enunciated for the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Harlan: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as 
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmen-
tal restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what 
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us. . . . 
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to 
be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, how-
ever, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader 
enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That 
the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a 
sign of weakness but of strength . 
. . . Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "[o]ne of the preroga-
tives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and mea-
sures-and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the 
freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." Baumgartner v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944). 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971). It is also this spirit, I believe, that animated 
the very powerful (and, for me, convincing) dissent by Judge Bazelon in Brandywine-Main 
Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16,63 (D.C. Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). 
The point developed in the text is meant to be a larger one, directed at the inhibiting 
discouragement of the fairness doctrine itself, and not limited to the separate (smaller) 
issue respecting the validity of section 303 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D) (1970), 
that provides that the Commission has the "authority to suspend the license of any 
operator upon proof sufficient to satisfy the Commission that the licensee ... (D) has 
transmitted . . . signals or communications containing profane or obscene words, lan-
guage, or meaning. . . ." For an excellent critical review of that section, see Note, Filthy 
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In brief, the equal protection clause (or rather the equal pro-
tection principle) does not stand alone in the Constitution. And 
rather, if it is not to become a stultifying principle enacted into 
regulations that eliminate all occasions for jealousy and uneven-
ness by achieving a drab and uniform "centrism"78 on the air-
waves, it must take into account the astringent effect of more 
colorful (and indeed, more radical) principles within the same 
Constitution. The first amendment is one of these. The emphasis 
here, with all respect, is not predominantly on equality per se 
but on freedom per se: freedom from government and more par-
ticularly freedom from government's debilitating inhibitions 
upon one's own speech; freedom to say what one feels-without 
apology, without a muffling gentility, without genuflection to 
what others may think, and without the heavy moralism of surro-
gate obligation. 
To be sure, I have overdrawn the specific analogy between 
parks and the airwaves. One can readily anticipate the deserved 
rejoinder offered in terms of other "public forums" that them-
selves are constrained by public regulation at least as tight as 
anything captured by the fairness doctrine. There is, for instance, 
the very different analogy of public schools and public universi-
ties. These, too, are state own'ed. In these as well, choices are 
made through government about who shall teach there. The 
selection of those who teach is dictated in significant part by 
speech content, that is, by the dictation of subject matter. It is 
dictated as well by treatment of the subject matter-in other 
words, by the requirement that it be professionally responsible 
and, indeed, in an analogous sense that it be "fair." 
Words, the FCC and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. 
REv. 579 (1975). The authority of the FCC under this section received limited approval in 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (July 3, 1978), a 5-4 decision. The case 
involved the broadcasting of George Carlin's satiric album "Filthy Words" during an 
afternoon program about contemporary society's attitude toward language. The Court 
distinguished the case from Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (Paul Cohen's entr-
ance into a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket with "Fuck the Draft" written across 
the back was a protected political statement in a public place) by a "time, place and 
manner" analysis. · 
78. The tendency is eloquently criticized in Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine 
in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 
1, 77-89 (1973). The tendency is encouraged by the Commission's most recent reiteration 
of duties under the fairness doctrine, at 30 HAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 1282 (July 12, 1974): 
"[T]he broadcaster .• _ is not expected to present the views of all political parties no 
matter how small and insignificant. *** [T]he licensee should make a good faith effort 
to identify the major viewpoints and shades of opinion being debated in the community, 
and to make provision for their presentation." (Emphasis in original). 
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That this last control must dampen the proselytizing ardor 
of particular teachers is not to be doubted. But a teacher, though 
protected by the first amendment/9 is not wholly unaccountable 
for his classroom utterances and presumably may well be re-
quired to take into account the fair diversity of responsible opin-
ion relevant to the subject matter of his instruction.80 The teacher 
might be said to stand astride a classroom much as an FCC 
licensee stands astride an airwave. Even if those in attendance 
were present wholly voluntarily (equivalent to those who choose 
to tune to a given frequency), we would find it utterly unneces-
sary to grant the teacher the same range of polemical commit-
ment as he may enjoy in the streets, and we think it not at all 
strange to impose fiduciary obligations of professional fairness on 
his treatment of the subject. If one thinks of the airwaves in this 
way, and of licensees as fiduciaries of the public interest, then of 
course it cannot seem at all strange to explain the fairness doc-
trine in a way that isolates and suitably distinguishes the lone 
haranguer in the public park. 
Because of the extraordinary range of public forums, each of 
which has had its own particular first amendment tradition, sev-
eral of which provide some modicum of comparison with the air-
waves, but none of which exactly "fits," I see no point in trying 
to make a case that the Supreme Court was plainly wrong in Red 
Lion. The decision to reserve the airwaves from the vicissitudes 
of the private marketplace, wholly unpoliced by the first amend-
ment or by the equal protection clause, seems to me to have been 
a defensible one. Similarly, I believe it would have been a mistake 
to utilize anything resembling a bid-auction system of allocation 
(and, moreover, had it been used, by no means would it have 
settled the question of access). Neither did the determination to 
issue licenses for but three years seem mistaken, nor the decision 
to take antitrust considerations into account. And finally, a piau-
79. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Slochower v. 
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
80. See discussion in Van Alsytne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and 
the General Issue of Civil Liberty in THE CONCEPt' OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 59-86, 125-33 (E. 
Pincoffs ed. 1972). The 1940 Statement of Principles, jointly authored by the American 
Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges (and cur-
rently endorsed by more than one hundred professional associations), acknowledges the 
accountability of professional educators for wilfully compromising the treatment of one's 
subject. See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 
DUKE L.J. 841. 
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sible case can be made even for the additional imposition of some 
public interest, fiduciary obligations upon all licensees. There are 
almost as many vantage points along the Mobius strip of our first 
amendment as there are analogies within the pluralism of public 
forums from which to gain perspective. 
Perhaps, therefore, even as Professor Bollinger has sug-
gested,81 it is the fuller sweep of the whole tradition (a tradition 
that includes Tornillo as importantly as it includes Red Lion) 
that should give us sufficient confidence and repose that the li-
censing regime of the FCC is, within its current limits, satisfac-
tory after all. Certainly one cannot say that the case against the 
fairness doctrine is so clear-cut that the Supreme Court should 
necessarily have set its face against the ratification that Congress 
itself gave to the doctrine. 
And yet, when one is finished with these myriad comparisons 
of other kinds of public forums, one may still believe that Red 
Lion was a first amendment misfortune. In yielding to the fear of 
licensee abuse, the fairness doctrine may ultimately betray a lack 
of confidence in the presuppositions of the first amendment itself. 
By inadvertently modeling the airwaves more nearly on the con-
trolled, instructional environment of academic forums than on 
the freer spirit of the public park or the avowed partisanship of 
much of the press, the fairness doctrine means, in practice, that 
there will be few, if any, Great Speckled Birds of the air and, 
indeed, no place at all within this vast forum for a Red Lion to 
roar. What can possibly be plainer than that the luminescence of 
the first amendment itself is dimmed whenever freedom for pas-
sionate expression is systematically discouraged by state-
imposed duties of fiduciary obligation and the yellow light of self-
restraint? 
Despite weak attempts to distinguish it on other grounds, 
moreover, Tornillo is a case that represents a fundamentally dif-
ferent and more confident view of the first amendment. The 
practical hopelessness of countering the immediate partisanship 
of the Miami Herald was persuasively presented to the Supreme 
Court, and rightly acknowledged in the CBS opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas. Additionally, only the weakest kind of case can be 
made for the ubiquitousness of the fairness doctrine spread 
through every market and every airwave. Given the actuality of 
81. Bollinger, supra note 34. 
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alternative radio signals readily receivable in virtually every com-
munity, and the doubtful ability of any one radio station to domi-
nate the politics or tastes of an average city or town, the rationale 
for imposing the fairness doctrine on all of radio broadcasting 
(precisely the case in Red Lion itself) borders on the mythical, if 
not the absurd. Given the antitrust authority of the Commission 
to provide for reasonable deconcentration among television licen-
sees and across types of media frontiers and given also the rapid 
development of cable television (which is already collapsing the 
premises of the "scarcity" rationale itself), 82 a different outcome 
in Red Lion would surely not have risked very much. That differ-
ent outcome would have expressed more confidence in ourselves 
and in others, repudiating the doleful view that we are helpless 
captives of night riders on the air or that we need protection from 
every political charlatan who may seek to corrupt us with 1,000 
watts of radio power. That different outcome, far more consistent 
with Tornillo, would have placed a higher value on the right to 
passionate expression and to that robust freedom of speech that 
animates our first amendment.83 
82. See the discussion (and multiple citations) in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 
F.2d 9, 43-51 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Midwest Video v. FCC, 46 U.S.L.W. 2447 (8th 
Cir., Feb. 21, 1978). 
83. I have frankly not thought through an adequate formulation that puts into con-
vincing language a suitable first amendment proposition that would capture the point of 
this closing section. I am quite sure that others can do a far better job of it, and I hope 
that they will. Something of the following sort (but less trivially expressed) seems to be 
called for: however limited a "property" one may hold by government sufferance, that 
interest may not be additionally burdened by subjecting it to the demands of others as a 
condition of using it to present some point of view of one's own exclusive choosing. 
Whether the "property" is the limited interest of an FCC licensee or the limited interest 
of a tenant in a public housing unit, the principle seems soundly grounded in the first 
amendment. 
The Court has long held that no person may be made the unwilling herald of other 
people's politics, whether they be the government's own or those of private third parties. 
See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
U.S. 705 (1977); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); West 
Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 
424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976). And a portion of the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976), set its face against the notion that restricting some from speaking because 
others may lack the means to command equivalent forums is compatible with the first 
amendment: "levelling down" speech is an unacceptable view of equal protection. As 
noted in the text, moreover, the decision in Tornillo proceeds on the assumption that the 
imposition of self-abnegating duties as a condition of one's own controversial comments 
is likely to be more speech-stultifying than speech-enhancing. At the very least, a substan-
tial burden of exceptional justification should rest on government insofar as it demands a 
departure from this approach. Very likely that burden can be shouldered in certain instan-
ces. An example is the controlled instructional environment of the public school classroom 
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within which the teacher's utterances are sheltered by the first amendment's protection 
of academic freedom. But the classroom situation otherwise presents itself in sharp con-
trast, rather than as any credible functional likeness, to the airwaves. See, e.g., Parducci 
v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.n: Ala. 1970). 
